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errorism as a legal category in American law is quite recent in origin. 
The term itself did not come into popular usage until the 1 9 6 0 ~ ~  In T the 1970s, FBI Director William Webster changed the designation 
covering investigations into certain crimes from “domestic security’’ to 
“terrori~m.”~ Still, according to B.L. Smith, as late as 1994, no federal crime 
called terrorism as such e x i ~ t e d . ~  It would not be until April of 1996 that the 
Clinton administration would pass the now much-talked about Anti-Tmr- 
&m Und~~ec~~eDeu~hPenaltyAct  (Pub. Law 104-132). One of the more 
abstruse side effects of terrorism’s late and uneasy induction into the Ameri- 
can legal lexicon has been that Western scholars (Muslim and non-Muslim 
alike) have devoted scant attention to the Islamic legal definition of terrorism. 
Experts on Islam and the Middle East routinely speak about terrorism in 
political, moral, religious or even clash-of-civilization terms. Analogous 
Islamic legalcategories, meanwhile, remain buried beneath an array of 
archaic and misleading designations such as “brigandage,” “banditry” or 
“highway robbery.” These were the terms in use at the time the study of 
Islamic law was first taken up  in the West, and under the weight of scholarly 
tradition, they have maintained their hegemony as translations for the Islamic 
legal category of birdbat, or qat ‘a/:tarr;7, despite the obvious parallels 
between the latter and terrorism. As a result of this obfuscation, there has yet 
to appear a solid Islamic legal treatment of terrorism.5 
Close examination of the classical Islamic law of birabuh, however, 
reveals that this law corresponds in its most salient features to domestic 
terrorism in the American legal system. This holds despite a number of 
important differences between hirdbab and domestic terrorism. First, the 
importance of the political motivations of would-be terrorists appears to be 
inversely proportional in the two systems. Whereas the pursuit of political 
aims tends to heighten or perhaps establish the correspondence between 
publicly directed violence and terrorism in American law, in Islamic law it 
293 
0 THE MUSLIM WORLD VOLUME 91 FALL 2001 
tends to have the opposite effect. In other words, to the extent that a group 
declares itself or is deemed by the government to be acting in pursuit of 
political objectives (and the assumption here is that these are grounded in 
some interpretation of religion), their activity is actually laxlikely to fall 
under the law of hirabab. Second, the importance attached to numbers 
appears to be inversely proportional in the two systems. Under Islamic law, 
the greater the number of individuals involved in apn’mfucieact of terror- 
ism, the Zaslikely to fall under the laws of birabah. By comparison, accord- 
ing to FBI guidelines issued in 1983, a terrorism investigation may not even 
be initiated unless circumstances indicate that two or more persons are 
involved in an offensee6 Third, Birabab, at least in its hlly developed form, 
appears to be potentially a much broader category than terrorism proper, 
covering as it does a spectrum of crimes ranging from breaking and entering 
to “hate crimes” to rape to terrorism proper. Here, however, given the broad 
range of criminal statutes under which most terrorists are prosecuted in the 
United States, this difference may turn out to be more apparent than it is real. 
Indeed, few terrorists are actually tried in America for bonafideacts of 
terrorism perse. Instead, they are usually pursued and prosecuted on 
charges having to do with trafficking in or possessing illegal weapons, 
money-laundering, or attempts to conceal and/or falsify identity.’ Finally, 
whereas American law appears to target terrorism that is directed toward the 
realization of goals that lie beyondacts of violence themselves, Islamic law 
punishes terrorism, period, be it directed hyondor merely coZncidmfaZ to 
the occurrence of a violent or heinous act. 
At the outset, I would like to say a word about the nature and structure of 
the Islamic legal system. Islamic law represents what some scholars have 
referred to as an extreme case of “jurists’ law.” Being neither the product nor 
preserve of the early Islamic state, it developed in conscious opposition to 
the latter. Private Muslims in pious devotion to the study of scripture, during 
the first two centuries of Islam, succeeded in gaining the community’s recog- 
nition for their interpretive efforts as constituting the most authentic repre- 
sentations of divine intent. By the middle of the 3‘d I~lamic/9‘~ Common Era 
century, a full blown legal theory had developed, with the Qur%n, the Sunna 
(or normative practice of the Prophet), and the consensus of the jurists as the 
sotlrcesof Islamic law, and analogy (qQadas the primary means of extend- 
ing these to treat unprecedented cases. During this same period, the jurists 
began to organize themselves into guilds or schools of law, called mdbbabq 
and by the end of the 4th/10th century, the mdbbabhad emerged as the sole 
repository of legal authority. From this point on, all interpretive activity, if it 
was to be recognized as authoritative or “orthodox,” would take place within 
a recognized school of law. By the end of the Sh/llth century, the number of 
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Sunni madbbabswould settle at four, at which number they would remain 
right down to modern times. These were the Hanafi, Mdiki, Shnfi'i and 
Hanbali schools, all equally orthodox, all equally authoritative. The main 
branch of Shi'ism, the Imiimi Twelvers (with whom I will not have occasion 
to deal in this paper) had one main madbbab the Ja'fari school. These 
schools continued to maintain their monopoly over legal authority and 
interpretation unchallenged until the introduction of Western legal and 
educational systems during the colonial period. 
Hiriibah = Terrorism 
The obvious starting point in any attempt to establish correspondence 
between terrorism and hirabab is with the definitions of these terms. In the 
United States, the agency charged with investigating real and suspected 
instances of terrorism is the FBI, which defines terrorism as, . . . the unlawful 
use of force or violence against persons or property to intimidate or coerce a 
government, the civilian population, or any segment thereof, in furtherance 
of political goals8 
A prominent, if not essential, ingredient of this definition is clearly its 
focus on intimidation, i.e. the desire to induce and/or spread fear? This fear, 
however, is not merely coincidental to the occurrence of heinous acts but is 
directed toward the realization of goals that lie beyond the acts themselves. 
This is in fact what distinguishes an act of terrorism-e.g. the 1996 bombing 
of the Federal Building in Oklahoma-from a random act of violence, such as 
the shooting at Columbine High School in Littleton, Colorado.lo While both 
of these acts engendered widespread public fear, the bombing of the Federal 
Building appeared to be directed at a target beyond its immediate victims. 
The United States government, in other words, or society at large, was being 
called upon to implement certain changes, in the absence of which society 
could expect more violent action. In this context, adherence to the status 
quo, or life as we know it, came to represent an imminent threat to 
everyone's safety. It is this kind of intimidation or spreading of fear that lies 
at the heart of terrorism in American law, 
When we turn to classical Islamic definitions of hirabab, we find that 
here too the elements of intimidation and spreading fear are central. The 
Spanish Miiliki jurist Ibn 'Abd al-Barr (d.463/1070) defines the agent of 
hirabab as "Anyone who disturbs free passage in the streets and renders 
them unsafe to travel, striving to spread corruption in the land by taking 
money, killing people or violating what God has made it unlawful to violate 
is guilty of &ah&. . . be he a Muslim or a non-Muslim, free or slave, and 
whether he actually realizes his goal of taking money or killing or not."" The 
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Hanafi jurist, al-Kas2ni (d.587/1191) defines biribub (or qq‘ul-!afiq) as 
“attacks upon pedestrians for the purpose of taking money by force and in 
such a way that people are rendered unable to pass freely through the streets 
. , . ”l2 Imam al-Nawawi (d.676/1277) states that, “Whoever brandishes a 
weapon and terrorizes the streets (ukhufa al-subioinside or outside a city 
must be pursued by the authorities (al-Imam), because if they are left unmo- 
lested their power will increase and through their killing and taking money 
and corruption will spread.”13 Ibn Quamah  (d.620/1223) defines hirdbub as 
“the act of openly holding people up in the desert with weapons in order to 
take their money.”** He notes, however, that many of his fellow Hanbalites 
held that such wanton brigandage constituted hiribub whenever it occurred, 
“because it is even more frightening and detrimental inside cities.”15 
In their elaborations, these jurists confirm that hirabub is distinguished 
by its connection to the spreading of fear fikbu7ub)aand helplessness (udum 
ul-gbuwtb)and the fact that no effective security measures can be taken 
against it ( ta~~bdburul- i~ziraz) .  The Shnfi‘i jurist, al-Nawawi, for example, 
notes that early authorities like Malik (d.179/795) and Aba Ijanifa (d. 150/ 
767)16 restricted their designation of Qirabub to acts committed in 
unpopulated, isolated areas, because it was only in these areas that people 
were really rendered helpless. Urban victims would always be surrounded 
by other people who could conceivably come to their aid.” This is the 
underlying logic of Ibn Qudamali’s discussion, which limits hiribub to acts of 
brigandage committed in the desert.I8 In a similar vein, the majority of 
Shafi‘is are reported to have held that if a group storms a man’s house with 
the intention of robbing him and then threatens to kill him if he makes any 
noise, their effort to silence him would disqualify their crime from being 
considered an act of birabah, because their attempts to conceal their pres- 
ence from the neighbors would contradict any intention to spread fear and 
helplessness.’9 Meanwhile, the famed Hanbali Ibn Taymiyah (d. 728/1328) 
registered an opposing view but for reasons that confirm the centrality of 
spreading fear and helplessness. He says that if renters, doctors or craftsmen 
lure people into their places of business in order to kill them by stealth 
(ostensibly for the purpose of taking their money), then these offenders are 
guilty of hirabah because, “killing by stealth (ghf2ab)is like killing with no 
regard for who is watching (mukabarazunJ andno secun9 measures cun 
be taken against either ofzbese (wu kiZabum Zu yumkin al-ibtirdz minb)?O 
Essentially the same point is made by al-KiisPni, but this time with an interest- 
ing twist. He notes that a number of uanafi jurists, beginning with the 
eponymous AbQ Hanifa himself, exempted women altogether from the law 
of &rd6ab, based on their belief that women, though perfectly capable of 
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both killing and robbing, were incapable, by their very constitution, of 
bringing about widespread fear and helplessness.21 
ing modifications in Islamic criminal law. For example, under the law of 
intentional homicide 
Hanafis, is that the murder of a non-Muslim by a Muslim is a civil offense for 
which the family of the victim can only demand blood money, not execution, 
as would be the case if the victim was a Muslim. A number of jurists insisted, 
however, that in some instances such murders constitute acts of Birabah for 
which the Muslim perpetrators are to be executed. Now, what qualifies such 
a murder as an act of Birabab appears to be the lack of any personal relation- 
ship between the parties, such that the victim might either be able to recon- 
cile with or to avoid persons with whom he has antagonistic relationships. In 
other words, the fact that the Jewish or Christian victim does not know his 
killer implies that the killer targeted not simply this Jew or this Christian but 
rather anyJew or anyChristian. As such, noJew and noChristian would be 
safe, because they could not take any security measures against such an 
equal opportunity killer. Thus, we find even the reputedly puritanical Ibn 
Taymiya, his polemical theological writings against Jews and Christians 
notwithstanding, insisting that the strongest opinion among those espoused 
by the jurists was that the Muslim murderer in such cases mtrstbe executed- 
as a duty, incidentally, upon the authorities, not at the behest of the victim’s 
family-“because,” according to him, “this is a crime against the public at 
large Qiannahu qatala lialfiadal-+imm).”22 Similarly, a number of later 
MPliki jurists, e.g. al-Dardir, al-$Pwi, imply that if a Muslim forcibly enters a 
non-Muslim’s house and the latter ends up killing him in defense of his 
property and/or the honor of his family, such a killing would be treated 
essentially as an act of “~elf-defense.”~3 
lurk in the background as a consideration alongside the spread of fear and 
helplessness in judging acts as constituting instances of hirabab. From this 
perspective, the definitions and elaborations cited appear to be more sugges- 
tive of something along the lines of armed robbery, banditry or extortion 
than they are of terrorism perse Closer examination reveals, however, that 
while the money-taking motive is clearly a consideration, this is simply 
because money-taking was the most commonly assumed reason for why 
individuals engage in acts of birabab, not because money-taking was itself a 
sine qua non. The sine qua non of hiiabah was, again, the spreading of fear 
and helplessness. This is most clearly manifested among MPliki jurists 
(especially later MQliki jurists) in the distinction they draw between hirzzbah 
and ghasb (unlawful appropriation). 
The element of helplessness provides the basis for a number of interest- 
the general rule, accepted by all but the 
In most if not all of these depictions, the money-taking motive appears to 
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In his al-Sbarb al-$agbi;r; Ahmad al-Dardir (d.1201/1786) cites the 
definition of gbasbgiven by Ibn al-Hajib (d.646/1248) as the going definition 
in the Mlliki mdbhab. According to this definition, gbasbconsists of: 
forcibb and wmn&ul& taking anofher’s monq withour engaging in 
birabab (akbu malqabran ta hdiyan bila &rabab)?4 Al-Dardir points out 
that this definition is actually defective inasmuch as it relies upon prior 
knowledge of the definition of hirabab. He notes, however, that this defi- 
ciency can be easily overcome by substituting “without inspiring fear of 
being killed (bila kbawjqatZin))” for “without engaging in birabah. ” In 
other words, birabab is distinguished from gbmbnot by the element of 
taking money but by the element of inspiring fear for one’s life. This fear, 
however, goes beyond the immediate victim (who is obviously afraid and for 
that reason gives up his money) and has the effect of discouraging others 
from undertaking their normal course of activity, again, out of fear for their 
lives. This is clearly brought out in another manual by al-Dardir, al-Sbarb al- 
kabf6 wherein he states that if the victim of such robberies has immediate 
access to people who could come to his rescue, then the act of taking his 
money would not constitute an act of biiabab but an act of ghasb.z5 In other 
words, the presence of people to come to his aid both precludes the spread- 
ing of fear and preempts the occurrence of helplessness, both of these being 
essential elements that define birabab and set it apart from gbasb which, 
incidentally, carries only discretionary sanctions, as opposed to the harsh 
mandatory punishments for birabab. 
On this understanding, later Maliki jurists isolate the spreading of fear 
and helplessness as the ration essendiand extend the scope of birabab to 
cover all sorts of crimes where the money-taking motive is completely 
absent. Al-Dardir, for example, defines birdbab explicitly as “. . . blocking 
the streets (qd{raZ-{an?qA i.e. terrorizing them @kh@ba) by preventing 
their free passage, i.e. by preventing people from freely traveling them, even 
if there is no attempt to take their money.”26 His 13‘h/19th century commen- 
tator, Ahmad al-Slwi (d.1241/1825), in explaining the last sentence adds 
“Even if his aim is merely to prevent people from enjoying the benefit of 
freely traveling the streets ( . w  qqada mu~a~admancaZ-init~u’biaZ- 
munjrfibu). “27 Another commentator, Shams al-Din al-Dastiqi (d. 1230/ 
1815>, is even more explicit in his clarification. He writes, 
One who engages in Qirdbahis one who terrorizes the streets (ahhafa 
a&ariq! in order to prevent people from freely traveling them. That is to 
say, it is anyone who terrorizes the people in the streets in such a way 
that prevents them from freely traveling them and from enjoying the 
benefit thereof, even if he does not aim to take their money but rather 
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only to prevent them from enjoying the benefit of freely traveling the 
streets. . . 28 
As with other authorities mentioned, al-Dastiqi goes on to apply this 
notion of spreading fear and helplessness to any situation in which individu- 
als are rendered helpless. This brings him to endorse the controversial 
principle to the effect that all acts of murder committed by stealth, e.g. 
poisoning, drugging (and, by extension, more modem activities such as car- 
bombings), fall under the law of birab~b.2~ To be sure, these jurists all 
recognized how problematic and dangerous such a broad construction of 
birdbub could be. Thus, we find them laying down all kinds of riders and 
qualifiers that would set Qiribub off from more routine acts of theft, robbery, 
pilferage, murder and the like. In the end, however, birabubassumes its 
place as an effective super-category hovering above the entire criminal law as 
a possible remedy to be pressed into service for the more sensational, hei- 
nous or terr@ing manifestations of these and other crimes. In this capacity, 
Qiiabub appears, again, to parallel the function of terrorism as an American 
legal category. Its function is not so much to define specific crimes but to 
provide a mechanism for heightening the scrutiny and/or level of pursuit and 
prosecution in certain cases of actual or potential public vi0lence.3~ 
In sum, we may conclude that it is terror, or the spreading of fear and 
helplessness, that lies at the heart of Qiiabah. From this perspective, Qiribah 
speaks to the same basic issue as does terrorism in American law. As men- 
tioned earlier, however, ,hiizbub actually goes beyond the FBI definition of 
terrorism, inasmuch as Qiiabub covers both directed andcoincidental 
spreading of fear. Thus, for example, both the bombing of the Federal 
Building in Oklahoma undthe shooting at Columbine High School in Colo- 
rado would fall under the law of Qiiabah. So too would the 1999 shooting at 
the Jewish community center in California3' and the 1998 sniper assassina- 
tion of the abortion doctor inside his New York home.32 
Punishments 
fliiabubj it turns out, is the most severely punished crime in Islam, 
carrying mandatory criminal sanctions (budI2dh. badd). A typical explana- 
tion for the severity of these sanctions is given by the 7th/13th century Spanish 
M2liki jurist, Muhammad b. Ahmad al-Quflubi, who writes, 
Hfrdbah is extremely detrimental because it prevents people from being 
able to earn a living. For, indeed, commerce is the greatest and most 
common means of earning a living, and people must be able to move 
about in order to engage in commerce. . . But when the streets are 
terrorized (ukhUaJ people stop traveling and are forced to stay at home. 
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The doors to commerce are closed and people are unable to earn a 
living. Thus, God instituted the severest punishments for &iihbas a 
means of humiliating and discouraging the perpetrators thereof and in 
order to keep the doors of business open.33 
The severest punishments to which al-Qufiubi refers are explicitly 
outlined in Qur‘an, 533-34, virtually the beginning and end of all juristic 
discussions on hirabab. 
Verily the recompense for those who wage war against God and His 
Messenger and strive to spread corruption in the land is that they be 
executed or crucified or that their hands and feet be amputated from 
opposite sides or that they be banished from the earth. That is for them a 
humiliation in this life, and in the Next Life they shall receive a grievous 
chastisement. Except for those who repent before you are able to 
subdue them. And know that God is Forgiving, and Merciful. 
These punishments are quite straightforward, as a result of which the 
jurists display a great deal of unanimity in their interpretations of these 
verses. Still, there were disagreements. The first of these was over the 
meaning of “or” ( ‘izru”in Arabic) that separates these punishments from each 
other. The majority, the Hanafis, Shafcis and Hanbalis, held that “or” implied 
a kind of ascending order 0afifb)commensurate with the particulars attend- 
ing the act of hirabah. If the terrorists killed people without taking any 
money, they were only subject to execution; if they killed people and took 
money, they were subject to execution and crucifixion (in that order, accord- 
ing to some; in the reverse, according to others); if they did not kill but only 
took money, they were subject to having their right hand and left foot ampu- 
tated; and if they neither killed nor took money, they were only subject to 
exile, some, like the early Hanafis, interpreting this to refer to imprison- 
ment.% 
The big dissenters on this question were the Mdikis, who, in cases that 
did not involve killing, left the choice of punishment entirely to the discretion 
of the authorities. In the Mnliki view, one guilty of hirabab could be ex- 
ecuted or crucified even if they neither killed nor took money. Their reason- 
ing was that the spreading of fear, helplessness and a host of other evils 
could result from an act of hirahb that involved no killing or robbery. 
Indeed, Malik himself is on record as having once remarked that “Many a one 
is there who commits biizfbab who does not kill but who spreads more fear 
(buwa akbwafland is more detrimental to society in the fear that he spreads 
(ayamufma&nfikhawfib) than one who actually kills people.”35 
A second disagreement arose over the amount of property a terrorist 
would have to take in order to be subject to amputation. According to the 
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law of theft, the property stolen by a thief must exceed a certain value (n&ah 
i.e. 1/4 d’nalt; or about $16.94, according to my calculations) in order for the 
thief to be subject to punishment for theft. The question then arose as to 
whether this logic should extend to the law of birabab. The ShPficis,s 
Hanabalis3’ and a majority of Hanafis (with some qualifications)38 held that 
it did. The MPlikis held that it did not, and for them, one guilty of ~trzJbab 
was subject to amputation regardless of the value of the property taken. 
who were not directly involved in any killing (or robbing) were subject to 
execution (or other punishment) along with the actual killers. The ShPfi‘is 
held that only those directly responsible were subject to execution.39 The 
Hanafis, Mdikis and Hanbalis, meanwhile, held accomplices equally respon- 
~ible.~O 
On the question of repentance and their interpretation of the verse 
“Except those who repent before you are able to subdue them,” all of the 
schools agree that if one repented beforebeing apprehended, e.g. by turning 
oneself in and displaying plain indications of a change of heart, the manda- 
tory criminal sanctions (execution, crucifixion, amputation and exile) were to 
be dropped, as “rights of God (baqqAZ&b2 And know that God is Forgiving, 
Merciful.” Civil liability @aqq aZ-ddaml), however, the right of a victim’s 
family to demand execution or reimbursement for stolen or damaged prop- 
erty, could not be set aside.41 
ments for &rdbabdiscussed by classical jurists and their heirs. 
A third disagreement involved the question of whether accomplices (M9 
These were some of the most important differences regarding the punish- 
Restrictions: Hirabah vs. Political Speech 
The severity of the punishments for @iibab caused jurists to develop 
another set of qualifications that would effectively separate btrabab from 
acts that may be interpreted as constituting a form of political speech, so as 
not to sacrifice the latter to a sloppy and overinclusive construction of the 
former. This had less to do with any strict application of agreed upon rules 
of scriptural interpretation than it did with practical considerations in re- 
sponse to concrete historical circumstances. The early history of Islam was 
fraught with a number of religio-political schisms that often led to open 
rebellion. The most important of these were the rebellions against the 
fourth caliph, (Ali b. Abi TPlib, first by the Companions, Talbah, Zubayr and 
‘kishah, then by the governor of Syria, Mu‘iiwiyah b. Abi SufyQn, and then 
by the KhPrijites, who finally succeeded in assassinating [Ali. ‘Ali’s clemency 
in dealing with these insurgents, in his capacity as head of the Muslim state, 
set a precedent that would later exert a major influence on juristic discus- 
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sion. The Umayyads, meanwhile, ‘Ali’s former foes who succeeded him on 
his death, and then the ‘Abbnsids after them, were not so kindly disposed 
towards rebels. Their tendency was rather to apply the very severest pun- 
ishments outlined in the discourse on birabah to rebels and political dissi- 
dents. It was against this tendency that jurists developed a separate law, the 
law of rebellion (ahkam al-bugbaa based on Qur’an 49:9-1042 and the 
precedent set by Ali b. Tfilib. Under this law, insurrections were simply to 
be put down, captured rebels could be neither executed nor tortured, and 
after the rebellion had been crushed and the rebels repented, they were 
simply to be set free with nopunirbment. They were not liable for any 
killing or property damage committed during the course of the rebellion. 
They could only be punished, according to some jurists, for “crimes” unre- 
lated to the success of the rebellion; rape, for instance.43 
There were essentially two major considerations on the basis of which an 
act of birababwas to be distinguished from an act of bag& or rebellion. It 
is in light of the considerations I stated earlier that the significance attached to 
numbers and the political motivations of would-be terrorists appears to be 
inversely proportional in Islamic and American laws of terrorism. 
jurists referred to as a ta?& or “a plausible interpretation” that might justify, 
at least in their minds, rebellion as a means of redress or of carrying out the 
Qur’anic imperative to command what is good and forbid what is evil. It 
does not matter if the interpretation is “wrong” or even heterodox; what 
matters is that it be plausible; that the language of the Qur’%n and/or Sunna 
or the circumstantial and contextual indicators surrounding this language 
couldaccommodate such a reading. In fact, the focus of the rebels’ interpre- 
tation might even be purely “political” as opposed to religious. It is com- 
monly agreed, for example, that Talhah Zubayr and ‘&ishah (the wife of the 
Prophet) all relied on a plausible interpretation in rising against ‘Ali, though 
the issue under dispute was purely political, namely, ‘Ali’s refusal to pursue 
the murderers of his predecessor, ‘Uthmfin!4 In sum, it is essentially the 
appearance or the rebels’ insistence that their actions are based on their 
understanding of their duty as Muslims that confers upon these actions the 
status of “political speech.” This sets them apart from criminal acts of 
&iahh. 
of force OhawkahJ measured mainly in numbers and military prepared- 
n e s ~ . ~ ~  The jurists differed on this number. The 7th/13* century al-QarAfi 
notes that a number of jurists placed it at ten; but he of all people would 
admit that this was a question of fact, not law, and that this number could 
increase or decrease, depending on the jurists’ and/or the authorities’ assess- 
The first of these considerations was that the rebels be motivated by what 
The second stipulation was that the rebels be backed by a sufficient level 
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ment of the situation.46 This stipulation has the effect of reserving the more 
lenient law of rebellion for the most serious and widespread cases of public 
disaffection. That is to say, the greivances that allegedly prompt a group to 
rebel must be serious and widespread enough to enlist the support of signifi- 
cant numbers of people. Otherwise, small groups of extremists, sophomoric 
idealists, prurient bandits or terrorists will be denied the refuge afforded by 
the law of rebellion and be treated under the more severe and salutary law of 
birabab. 
Hiriibah in Twentieth Century Muslim Discourse 
Legal discussions of hirdhzb in the 14th/20th century follow, for the most 
part, the contours laid down in premodern times. The definitions remain 
essentially the same and the creative process by which premodern jurists 
extracted the law of birahzb from Qur‘%n 533-34 is only perhnctorily 
questioned and then confirmed. In terms of the substance of the law, noth- 
ing of note is really added or taken away. There is, however, at least one 
new thrust or orientation that seems to have begun, as far as I can tell, with 
the reformers Muhammad ‘Abduh, once Grand Mufti of Egypt (d. 19051, and 
especially his student Muhammad Rashid Rid2 (d. 1935). This was the 
tendency to view birabah not simply as a threat to public security in general 
but more specifically as a threat to the sanctity and application of Islamic law 
as a legal system. Ri& for example, defines hhababas “the commission of 
acts in the lands of Islam that threaten the security of life, property and 
honor, while seeking immunity in the power of one’s group and refusing to 
submit willingly to the religious law.”*’ In other words, by hirabab, Rid% is 
referring to the actions of those who arm and organize themselves explicitly 
for the purpose of preventing the application of religious law either to 
themselves or others.4a Writing at a time when Islamic law was still in the 
process of losing ground to Western European laws, preference for which 
was now expressed and acted upon by indigenous Muslim rulers, it is easy to 
imagine the genesis and target of these views.49 Under the Tangbzdtre- 
forms of 1839-76, for example, the Ottomans adopted a Commercial Code 
that was essentially a direct translation of the French Commercial Code 
(including provisions for the payment of ‘interest’ (n’b& a Penal Code that 
was essentially a translation of the French Penal Code (which abolished all of 
the &addpunishments [hirihzb being one of themls0 except for that govern- 
ing apostasy), a Code of Commercial Procedure and a Code of Maritime 
Commerce, both of which were based on French law. From 1875 on, Egypt 
went even further than the Ottomans in their adoption of Penal, Commercial, 
Maritime and even Civil Codes, modeled almost exclusively on French law.51 
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Given this context, one can see how Rid2’s definition might have been read 
as an indictment of Muslim (and more specifically, Egyptian) rulers whose 
departures from traditional Islamic law he wanted to highlight as a proper 
concern of the law itself. Subsequent history would show Rid2 to have laid 
an important brick in the ideological foundation of resurgent Islam. 
But Ri&’s view did not have the immediate effect of displacing the 
traditional view. Rather, it would contribute to a phenomenon, quite com- 
mon in Islamic law, of old and new views running parallel to each other as 
proponents of each jockeyed to establish theirs as the dominant view.52 
With the traditional perspective clearly still incumbent, both of these views 
would be reflected, in varying degrees, in the writings of subsequent jurists 
all the way down to the present day. Shaykh Muhammad Sayyid al-Tantnwi, 
for example, former Grand Mufti of Egypt, now Rector of al-Azhar College of 
Islamic Law, alongside the traditional definition, speaks of hirabub as being 
the activity of those “who oppose the religious community’s established 
order” @u@nBzjn uZ-nzz&n uZ-qa’im Z i  uZ-ummbp Shaykh Wahbah 
Zuhayli of Syria writes that the only difference between &ribah and hgby 
(rebellion) is that the latter opposes the legitimate ruler on the basis of a 
“plausible religious interpretation” (tubi4 while the former does so without 
any such preten~e.5~ The most far reaching manifestation of the new orienta- 
tion of ‘Abduh and Ri& appeared in the work of a non- jur i~ t ,~~  the Egyptian 
one-time chief ideologue of the Muslim Brotherhood, Sayyid Qutb, who was 
executed in Egypt in 1966. 
In a move typical of non-jurist activists, Qutb begins not withjqh, or the 
legal discourse of the jurists, but with the Qur‘2n itself. This enables him to 
avoid having to fit (or perhaps force) the Qur’Pn into preexisting constructs 
of jurists; rather, he can interpret the Qur‘2n according to his own lights and 
then fit whatever aspects of jurists’ discourse he sees fit into this. He begins 
with Qur‘an 5 3 - 3 4  and defines birabab as “the act of rising, through orga- 
nized rebellion, against the legitimate Muslim authority (ul-Zmam uZ-MmZzm) 
who rules in accordance with the Law of Islam, in defiance of the latter’s 
authority, intimidating the Muslim population, and assaulting their persons, 
property and honor.”56 For Quyb, the essential charactaristic of birihb is 
the fact of its occurring in opposition to legitimate Muslim authority. But the 
sine qua nolz of legitimate Muslim authority is not simply the process by 
which an individual comes to power but the faithful application and uphold- 
ing of the shari‘a. Thus, Qutb rails against those traditional jurists who 
sanctioned the application of the punishment for birdbuh against those who 
rebelled against ostensibly Muslim rulers who did not derive their authority 
from religious law. According to Qutb, this completely undermined the 
intent of the law of birahb; for, in many instances, such revolts were being 
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waged not against God and His Messenger but against Muslim rulers who 
flaunted the law of God.57 From here, it is a very short and easy step to the 
conclusion that “legitimate Muslim authority” is not synonymous with the 
state but may apply to any collectivity actively involved in establishing a 
social and political order based on the law of Islam.% In this way, Qutb is 
able to challenge the legitimacy of the secular Egyptian state and to declare it 
to be the object of Qur’an 533-34.  According to him, spreading corruption 
and opposing God and His messenger are the target of these verses, and 
there can be no greater corruption or opposition to God and His messenger 
than the dismantling of Islamic law.59 On this understanding, combating 
corruption becomes the central focus of hirabah for Quyb. Meanwhile, the 
near obsession with general issues of public security that we saw in the 
discussions of the classical jurists palpably recedes into the background. 
of Islamic jurisprudence (though he himself seems not to have relied on this). 
Indeed, a number of early jurists had associated &Tabahwith the activities of 
groups who had formally apostatized and resorted to violence in an attempt 
to overthrow the Islamic social and political order.@ The classical jurists, 
however, as we have seen, would reject this restriction and construct a law of 
&Tabah that would include non-apostate terrorists, on the one hand, and 
exclude non-apostate rebels, on the other, providing in the case of the latter 
an alternative to complete annihilation. Ironically, it would be precisely 
those modern secularizing forces which equated their success with their 
ability to marginalize traditional legal authorities (whom they saw as standing 
in the way of progress) who would create the space in which views like 
Quyb’s would ultimately gain currency, particularly among young, ideologi- 
cally hungry and economically disenfranchised segments of the population. 
To be sure, Qutb’s views were not without precedent in the early history 
Conclusion 
Throughout Islamic history, Muslim jurists showed themselves to be 
keenly interested in protecting the community from those within its midst 
who seek to bring it harm through violence and terror. Early on they would 
turn to Qur‘an 5 3 - 3 4  to provide them with the means to develop legal 
constructs that served this interest. The law of hirabahwas the result of this 
effort. Far from a stagnant construct, however, birabah turned out to be an 
extremely malleable category, capable of assuming many different forms 
under many different circumstances. Indeed, the many features and different 
applications of the law of hirabab show themselves to have been just as 
indebted to historical experience and the creative acumen of jurists as they 
were to dictates of scripture. At bottom, however, the primary concern 
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remained essentially the same as that governing discussions of terrorism in 
American law: protecting the community against publicly directed violence. 
Even the modern revisionist approaches would not completely abandon this 
interest. Viewed from this perspective, we can see a clear cognate relation- 
ship between terrorism in American law and hirdbahin Islam. Such recogni- 
tion should encourage a more informed comparison between Islamic and 
American legal approaches. At the very least, such an exploration could 
deepen our confidence in the ability of the two systems to speak to and 
understand each other. At most, it might point the way to possible avenues 
of cooperation in a mutually shared interest in a safer, better world. 
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